kingston datatraveler vault privacy crack

Kingston datatraveler vault privacy crack password#
Kingston datatraveler vault privacy crack Offline#

The storage options range from 2TB to 8TB for the single-drive My Cloud Home, and 4TB to 16TB (in mirrored RAID) for the larger My Cloud Home Duo. I'd say that the data on that device is probably gone, unless you get lucky with the last try. With an impressive design on the outset and a good overall hardware, WD My Cloud Home counts good to be your personal cloud right there at the home. Now, it's possible that the manufacturer has implemented a different method, where the input is directly used to encrypt the data, but the steps outlined above are pretty well known and, given a reasonably secure key store on the device, really difficult to break.

That's infeasible to brute force when you don't know the key length or composition. Its not nearly as solid as the all-metal DataTraveler Locker.

Kingston datatraveler vault privacy crack password#

It also means that brute forcing the actual key used doesn't mean working out the relatively short password that you'd enter, but instead working out the internal key, which could well be much longer - even something relatively insecure, like a SHA-256 hash of the word 'password' would be 5e884898da28047151d0e56f8dc6292773603d0d6aabbdd62a11ef721d1542d8.

Kingston datatraveler vault privacy crack Offline#

Since this is intentionally inaccessible, you can't usually extract it for offline brute forcing, even if you can extract the rest of the data on the device. The result of all this is that if a manufacturer has constructed their drive in the 'correct' way, the password you enter is only used to decrypt the key which is used for the rest of the data. If a device instead encrypts based directly on the user input, you can't avoid the extra writes - you can't just forget the key, since the user has it, and may have left it lying around elsewhere, where some malicious person can find it and use it to decrypt the data. By removing and replacing the key, the data can effectively be rendered unreadable, without increasing the load on the flash memory with extra writes. This isn't a major problem if the entire device is encrypted - the remaining data, even if it can be extracted from the non-writable sectors, is encrypted, so remains secure. However, this also means that data may exist on sectors which are no longer writable, so it wouldn't be possible to securely wipe them. The reason for this is in how flash memory devices work: they are built with some spare capacity which is used to compensate for individual memory elements failing or wearing out through the expected lifetime of the device. This means that the device can be 'wiped' simply by wiping the key and replacing it with another one. The 'correct' way to implement hardware encryption on a flash memory device is to encrypt with a key stored in an inaccessible part of the device, which is itself encrypted with the user password.